The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control by Boukouras, Aristotelis et al.
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control
Citation for published version:
Boukouras, A, Aytimur, E & Schwager, R 2012 'The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy Control'.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Preprint (usually an early version)
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Boukouras, A., Aytimur, E., & Schwager, R. (2012). The Citizen-Candidate Model with Imperfect Policy
Control.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
The Citizen-Candidate Model
with
Imperfect Policy Control
R. Emre Aytimur∗,
Aristotelis Boukouras†,
Robert Schwager‡
August 2012
Abstract
We examine the two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model when
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an unelected external power. We show that the equilibria of this model diﬀer
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1 Introduction
The citizen-candidate model, pioneered by Osborne and Slivinsky (1996) and Besley
and Coate (1997), has become a major approach to analyze representative democracy.
Among the many equilibria of this model (see Dhillon and Lockwood (2002), Roemer
(2003)), special attention has been granted to equilibria with two candidates. In such
equilibria, a substantial cost of running for oﬃce prevents a convergence of policy
platforms. Conversely, if the cost of candidacy is small the model allows for equilibria
with two candidates proposing policies which are arbitrarily close to each other and
to the median’s preferred policy (see Persson and Tabellini (2002), p. 101-104). In
the present note, we show that this latter conclusion is no longer true if the elected
government cannot fully control the policy to be implemented but has to compromise
with an external power. If the ﬁnal policy is in between the ideal policies of the elected
citizen and the external power, then in any two-candidate equilibrium the distances
between the ideal policies and between the policies ﬁnally implemented by the two
candidates remain strictly above a positive threshold, even when the cost of running
for oﬃce becomes arbitrarily small.
The political importance of this result stems from the observation that quite often,
elected governments have to share power with an un-elected entity. For example, a
self-interested bureaucracy in the spirit of Niskanen (1971) may, by its expertise or
its control on executive functions, ’water down’ implemented policies. Similarly, an
interest group1 which has the means to disrupt public life, such as a union or an industry
association, can inﬂuence the policies eﬀectively enacted by the government. As a third
example, in developing countries even elected governments often feel compelled to take
the views of donor countries into account when formulating domestic policies. Finally,
when the International Monetary Fund or, recently, the European Union negotiate
economic programs with countries receiving debt relief, the resulting policies clearly
arise as a compromise between the preferences of the elected government and those of
the international institution. For these and similar situations, our result implies that a
polarization of candidates and policies is inevitable.
To arrive at this conclusion, we present a simple model where citizens have single-
peaked preferences over an unbounded one-dimensional policy space, decide non-cooperatively
whether to stand in an election, and vote strategically for one of the candidates. To for-
1Besley and Coate (2001) study the inﬂuence of lobbying in a citizen-candidate model. However,
since the government has full control over the policy in their model, they do not obtain our result.
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malize the inﬂuence of the external power, we assume that the ﬁnal policy is a weighted
average of the winner’s ideal policy and the external power’s preferred choice. We show
that the ideal policies of two candidates running in an equilibrium, and also the policies
ﬁnally implemented in case of victory, must diﬀer by a minimum amount. This minimal
distance increases in the strength of the external power and in the diﬀerence between
the median voter’s and its preferred policies, but is independent of the cost of candi-
dacy. This result obtains since otherwise, if two candidates with similar preferences
were to run, one of them would prefer the compromise between the other candidate
and the external power to the compromise she can obtain herself.
Our analysis is in line with several other contributions which show that adding in-
stitutional features to the standard citizen-candidate model can cause the candidates’
policies to diverge. Thus, Chambers (2007) provides a model where lobbies pay cam-
paign contributions to potential candidates so as to convince them to run. He shows
that this induces a minimum distance between the policies chosen in two candidate
equilibria. Our approach diﬀers from this result in that we consider an external power
which inﬂuences the policy after the election, rather than manipulating the election
itself. It has also been shown that ideal policies in a two-candidate equilibrium must
be suﬃciently far apart if the ﬁnal policy is a weighted average of the ideal policies of
all candidates (Hamlin and Hjortlund (2000)), or if the decision to stand in the election
must be taken before the distribution of voter preferences is known (Brusco and Roy
(2011)). Both Hamlin and Hjortlund (2000) and Brusco and Roy (2011) assume sincere
voting, and the driving force behind the divergence results is the threat of a third can-
didate entering on the fringe of the political spectrum. Contrary to that, in our model,
which is based on strategic voting, it does not pay oﬀ for the second candidate to enter
if policies are too close to each other. Thus, while these contributions arrive at similar
conclusions, our result is based on a fundamentally diﬀerent eﬀect.
Our result also contributes to the theory of strategic delegation in a political context.
This strand of literature emphasizes that the median voter, by electing someone with
preferences diﬀerent from herself, can compensate for unwelcome inﬂuences in the post-
election decision making, and thereby implement her preferred policy. For example,
Persson and Tabellini (1992) show that electing a citizen who likes higher taxes than
the median is a way to counteract the race to the bottom endemic in tax competition.
Similarly, Roelfsema (2007) shows that strategic delegation can overcome the free-riding
incentives present when countries set environmental standards in an uncoordinated way.
In an inter-temporal set-up, electing a citizen with a high endowment of capital is a way
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to commit to a low tax rate on capital, thereby preserving incentives to invest (Persson
and Tabellini (1994)). Other applications of strategic delegation refer, for example, to
joint production of a public good (Harstad (2010)), to monetary policy in the European
Central Bank (Fatum (2006)), or even to civil conﬂicts (Jennings and Roelfsema (2008)).
One-candidate equilibria of our model are perfectly in line with these results: Provided
the cost of candidacy is not too high, there is always an equilibrium where the ﬁnal
policy coincides with the median’s preferred choice. Contrary to that, in any two-
candidate equilibrium, the ﬁnal policies remain bounded away from the median’s ideal
policy, even for arbitrarily small cost of running for oﬃce. Thus, our result shows that
the power of strategic delegation is limited as long as one considers equilibria where
elections are indeed contested.
2 The Model
There are 푛 citizens with 푛 odd. Each citizen has single-peaked preferences over a
unidimensional policy 푝 ∈ ℝ. The ideal policy point of a citizen 푖 is denoted by 푝푖. The
median voter’s ideal policy is denoted by 푝푚.
There are three stages. In the ﬁrst stage, each citizen decides whether to stand for
election or not. Being a candidate costs 푐 > 0. In the second stage, voting takes place
according to the plurality rule. In case of a tie, every candidate which ties for the ﬁrst
place is selected as the winner with equal probability. In the third stage, if citizen 푖 is
the winner of the election, then the ﬁnal policy 푝푖푥 is a weighted average of her ideal
policy (푝푖) and the ideal policy of an external power (푝푥):
푝푖푥 = 훾푝푖 + (1− 훾)푝푥 (1)
with 0 ≤ 훾 ≤ 1. If no one runs for the election, then the ﬁnal policy becomes 푝푥.
The formula of the ﬁnal policy captures the idea that, ideally, the election’s winner
would like to implement her most preferred policy, but has to compromise with the
external power. 1− 훾 measures the power of this un-elected entity.
The equilibrium concept is subgame perfect equilibrium together with the elimina-
tion of weakly dominated voting strategies. From Proposition 3 in Besley and Coate
(1997) we know that a two-candidate equilibrium, which is the focus of the present
note, exists only if (a) both candidates attract an equal number of votes, and (b) for
both candidates, the gain in expected utility arising from changing the ﬁnal policy with
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probability 1/2 outweighs the cost of running.2
Making use of the necessary conditions (a) and (b), our result characterizes the set
of candidate pairs which can be observed in a two-candidate equilibrium.
Proposition 1. In any equilibrium with two candidates 푖 and 푗, ∣푝푖−푝푗∣ > 1−훾훾 ∣푝푥−푝푚∣.
Proof: Note that 푝푖 ∕= 푝푗, since otherwise one of the candidates would be better oﬀ not
running for the election and saving the cost 푐. Assume without loss of generality that
푝푗 = 푝푖 + 푑 with 푑 > 0. With (1), this implies 푝푗푥 > 푝푖푥. The key observation is that
푝푗 > 푝푖푥, since otherwise 푗 would prefer 푝푖푥 to 푝푗푥 (due to single-peaked preferences)
and would be certainly better oﬀ not running for the election (even with 푐 = 0). This
can be equivalently written as
푝푖 + 푑 > 훾푝푖 + (1− 훾)푝푥
which gives
푑 > (1− 훾)(푝푥 − 푝푖) (2)
As it is well known, in a two-candidate equilibrium, two candidates should tie. Due
to single-peaked preferences this is possible only if 푝푗푥 > 푝푚 > 푝푖푥. By substituting
equation (1) for 푝푖푥 into 푝푚 > 푝푖푥 and rearranging, we get:
푝푥 − 푝푖 > 푝푥 − 푝푚
훾
Combining this with inequality (2) gives
푑 >
1− 훾
훾
(푝푥 − 푝푚) (3)
In the same way, using the inequalities 푝푖 < 푝푗푥 (since otherwise 푖 would be better oﬀ
not being a candidate) and 푝푗푥 > 푝푚, it can be also shown that
푑 >
1− 훾
훾
(푝푚 − 푝푥) (4)
Inequalities (3) and (4) together complete the proof. Q.E.D.
2Besley and Coate (1997) also show that the necessary conditions (a) and (b) together are suﬃcient
for existence of a two-candidate equilibrium if in addition, (c) all voters strictly prefer the candidate
they vote for to the other candidate and the set of indiﬀerent voters is smaller than one third of the
electorate.
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Proposition 1 says that it is not possible to have two candidates whose ideal policies
are at a distance lower than 1−훾
훾
∣푝푥−푝푚∣ from each other, even if the cost of running as
a candidate is arbitrarily small. While this result relates only to the ideal points of the
candidates, the next corollary, which follows directly from Proposition 1 and equation
(1), shows that also the two potential ﬁnal policies are distant from each other by at
least (1− 훾)∣푝푥 − 푝푚∣.
Corollary 1. In any equilibrium with two candidates 푖 and 푗, ∣푝푖푥−푝푗푥∣ > (1−훾)∣푝푥−
푝푚∣.
3 Comments and Conclusion
The “standard” case with perfect policy control. If we set 훾 = 1 in (1), then the politi-
cian implements her ideal policy and we have the standard citizen-candidate model. In
this case it is easy to construct examples of two-candidate equilibria displaying arbi-
trarily close distance between the two candidates, by choosing a suﬃciently small cost
of running and an appropriate distribution of citizens’ ideal policy points.3 However,
if 훾 < 1, Proposition 1 tells us that any two candidates running must have substan-
tially diﬀerent ideal points, and that also the two potential ﬁnal policies diverge from
each other by a non-negligible amount. Put diﬀerently, our result shows that the pres-
ence of the external power precludes convergence of platforms and ﬁnal policies in
two-candidate equilibria of the citizen-candidate model.
Moreover, since the median’s preferred policy must be located between the policies
implemented by the two potential winners, in the standard model the two-candidate
equilibrium provides an institutional framework for (almost) implementing the median’s
preferences. Contrary to that, when an external power inﬂuences the policy outcome, at
least one of the ﬁnal policies necessarily stays bounded away from the median preferred
policy, no matter how small the cost of running is.
One-candidate equilibria. If we consider one-candidate equilibria, then our model
produces similar results to the “standard” model: if there is a citizen 푖 who compensates
the external power’s policy inﬂuence in such a way that the ﬁnal policy becomes (almost)
3For instance, if voter 푚 is indiﬀerent between 푝푖 and 푝푗 and half of the remaining 푛 − 3 voters
respectively have ideal policies smaller than 푝푖 and larger than 푝푗 , then a two-candidate equilibrium
with 푖 and 푗 running exists whenever the cost of running is small enough.
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the median voter’s ideal policy (i.e. 푝푖푥 = 푝푚 or arbitrarily close to it) then this citizen
푖 running unopposed constitutes a one-candidate equilibrium (given the cost of entry
is appropriately small). Even though citizen 푖 is not the median voter, the ﬁnal policy
is close to the median-voter’s ideal. But this result does not hold if we consider two-
candidate equilibria. In the latter case, as Corollary 1 shows, it is not possible for
the median voter to fully neutralize the inﬂuence of the external power by strategic
delegation.
To summarize, this note shows that the citizen candidate model implies a diver-
gence of ideal policies between candidates, and of ﬁnal policies implemented from the
preferences of the median, if one considers equilibria with two candidates running for
oﬃce and if the ﬁnal policy arises from a compromise between the elected government
and some un-elected entity such as a bureaucracy or foreign inﬂuences. Thus, while the
median voter result provides a useful benchmark in many political economic analyses,
it may be misleading if such an outside inﬂuence is relevant and elections are contested.
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